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399 
FAIR USE’S UNFINISHED BUSINESS 
REBECCA TUSHNET* 
It’s an honor and a pleasure to have the chance to say a few words about 
Judge M. Margaret McKeown’s Censorship in the Guise of Authorship: 
Harmonizing Copyright and the First Amendment.1  In the past, I’ve written 
extensively about my preferred view of the general relationship between 
copyright and the First Amendment.2  Here, I will confine myself to a few 
variations on Judge McKeown’s important themes. 
I.  OVERBROAD COPYRIGHT CLAIMS AND THE ENHANCED DAMAGE OF 
OVERBROAD DMCA CLAIMS 
First, Judge McKeown is absolutely right to emphasize that overbroad 
copyright claims asserted to stifle free speech continue to be a significant 
problem.3  Although Garcia v. Google, Inc.  presented unusual facts, I think 
that the trouble goes deeper than Judge McKeown acknowledges.  Ordinary 
theories of copyright have been used to suppress political speech ranging 
from a successful suit against an unauthorized translation of Hitler’s Mein 
Kampf designed to awaken Americans to the threat posed by Nazi ideology4 
to less weighty, but still notably successful, lawsuits against political uses of 
music inconsistent with composers’ beliefs.5 
Overbroad takedown notices under the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (“DMCA”) add to the trouble, proving a cheap quasi-injunction that 
doesn’t even require the claimant to go to court to take a work out of public 
 
 *  Professor, Georgetown Law. 
 1.  Hon. M. Margaret McKeown, Censorship in the Guise of Authorship: Harmonizing Copyright 
and the First Amendment, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (2016). 
 2.  Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common 
with Campaign Finance Reform, Hate Speech and Pornography Regulation, and Telecommunications 
Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2000). 
 3.  McKeown, supra note 1, at 2; see, e.g., Katz v. Google, 802 F.3d 1178, 1182 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(finding use of photo to criticize subject of photo was fair use); Galvin v. Illinois Republican Party, No. 
14 C 10490, 2015 WL 5304625, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2015) (holding use of photograph to make 
political point was fair use); Dhillon v. Does 1–10, No. C 13-01465 SI, 2014 WL 722592, at *1, *6 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 25, 2014) (same). 
 4.  Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Noram Publ’g Co., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 676, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). 
 5.  See, e.g., Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Browne v. McCain, 
612 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1131, 1133 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
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circulation.6  Paul Siemienski, WordPress’s general counsel, testified 
recently that due to the effectiveness of DMCA takedowns, abuses of the 
process are increasing.7  Google’s Transparency Report reveals numerous 
examples addressed to Google, but most intermediaries do not make 
transparency reports available, and thus the full scope of the problem is 
unknown.8  An analysis of fifty  million takedown notices submitted to 
Google determined that, at a lower bound using the most forgiving measures, 
8.3% had serious technical errors, and an additional 1.3% had serious 
substantive errors that could have been prevented at little or no cost to 
senders.9  These percentages represent nearly five million erroneous 
notices.10  Many of the worst offenders were repeat players in Google’s 
Trusted Sender program.11 
Another recent, random sample of takedown notices, taken from a set 
of over 108 million requests submitted to the Lumen archive over a six-
month period, reached similar conclusions: 
Nearly 30% of takedown requests were of questionable validity. In one 
in twenty-five cases, targeted content did not match the identified infringed 
work, suggesting that 4.5 million requests in the entire six-month data set 
were fundamentally flawed. Another 15% of the requests raised questions 
about whether they had sufficiently identified the allegedly infringed work 
of the allegedly infringing material. The analysis further identified 
significant questions related to the availability of potential fair use defense, 
complaints grounded on improper (non-copyright) claims, and requests sent 
to defunct web sites.12 
 
 6.  McKeown, supra note 1; see, e.g., Susan Park, Unauthorized Televised Debate Footage in 
Political Campaign Advertising: Fair Use and the DMCA, 32 SOUTHERN L.J. 29, 30–38 (2013) (offering 
examples at the national and local levels); Campaign Takedown Troubles: How Meritless Copyright 
Claims Threaten Online Political Speech, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY (Sept. 2010), 
https://cdt.org/files/pdfs/copyright_takedowns.pdf (offering further examples). 
 7.  Hearing on Section 512 of Title 17: No. 113-86 Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual 
Property, and the Internet, 113th Cong., 3, (2014) (testimony of Paul Sieminski), 
http://judiciary.house.gov/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=B343EABE-0BF1-44E9-8C85-B3478892B8E1. 
 8.  Google Transparency Report, 
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/copyright/faq/#abusive_copyright_requests (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2016). 
 9. Daniel Seng, “Who Watches the Watchmen?”: An Empirical Analysis of Errors in DMCA 
Takedown Notices, 32, 45 (2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2563202. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 6. 
 12. Jennifer M. Urban, Joe Karaganis & Brianna L. Schofield, Notice and Takedown in Everyday 
Practice, 2 (2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2755628. 
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Disturbingly, “one in fourteen (7.3%) of takedown requests raised 
questions of potential fair use defenses,”13 mostly having to do with remixes 
and other potentially transformative works.14 
Unfortunately, reckless takedown notices occur in all sorts of 
circumstances.  Even in 2015, content owners are taking down uses they have 
themselves authorized.15  In other cases, content owners send takedown 
notices based on fragmentary phrases or common words that happen to 
match the titles of their—and many other—works.16  Overbroad matching 
algorithms lead copyright owners to send takedown notices targeting mere 
reporting on their works, and even to demand takedowns of links to their 
own websites.17  Notice filers may make preposterous claims, reasoning that 
intermediaries have little incentive to risk their § 512 protection by 
scrutinizing them carefully and that individual users are unlikely to 
 
 13. Id. at 12. 
 14. Id. at 95. 
 15. See, e.g., Jordan Pearson, NBC’s Bogus Copyright Claim Got Canada’s ‘Mr. Robot’ Premiere 
Yanked from Google, VICE, Sept. 4, 2015, http://motherboard.vice.com/read/nbcs-bogus-copyright-
claim-got-canadas-mr-robot-premiere-yanked-from-google; Adam Rosenberg, ‘Pixels’ Copyright 
Notices Took Down the Studio’s Own Trailer, MASHABLE, Aug. 9, 2015, 
http://mashable.com/2015/08/09/pixels­dmca/?utm_cid=mash­com­fb­main­link 1/2; Clicky Steve, 
Automated DMCA Fail: When Bots Go Bad, TRANSPARENCY REPORT, April 9, 2015, 
http://transparency.automattic.com/201 5/04/09/Automated-Dmca-Fail-When-Botsgo-Bad/ (discussing 
widely used rights enforcement agency Attributor.com’s takedown of copyright owner’s own website); 
see also Annalee Newitz, How Copyright Enforcement Robots Killed the Hugo Awards, IO9, Sept. 3, 
2012, http://io9.com/5940036/how-copyright-enforcementrobots-killed-the-hugo-awards (discussing 
automated takedown of licensed footage that suppressed a larger broadcast). 
 16. See, e.g., Mike Masnick, A Glimpse of the Future Under SOPA: Warner Bros. Admits It Filed 
Many False Takedown Notices, TECHDIRT, Nov. 10, 2011, 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20111110/10135116708/glimpse-future-under-sopa-warner-bros-
admits-it-filed-many-false-takedown-notices.shtml. 
 17. See, e.g., Emil Protalinski, Why Automated DMCA Takedown Requests Are Asinine: HBO Asked 
Google to Censor Links to HBO.com, THE NEXT WEB, Feb. 13, 3013, 
http://thenextweb.com/media/2013/02/03/why-automated-dmca-takedown-requests-are-asinine-hbo-
asked-google-to-censor-links-to-hbo-com/#!zrspT (HBO provided takedown notices about 8 HBO links, 
as well as links to pages on Perez Hilton’s blog, Pinterest, MTV.com, and IGN.com that carried stories 
about the HBO content at issue); GOOGLE TRANSPARENCY REPORT, FAQ, 
https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/faq/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2014); 
GOOGLE TRANSPARENCY REPORT, 
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/copyright/faq/#abusive_copyright_requests (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2016) (“A major U.S. motion picture studio requested removal of the IMDb page for a 
movie released by the studio, as well as the official trailer posted on a major authorized online media 
service. A U.S. reporting organization working on behalf of a major movie studio requested removal of 
a movie review on a major newspaper website twice.”); Emil Protalinski, Microsoft Accidentally Asked 
Google to Censor BBC, CBS, CNN, Wikipedia, and Even the US Government, THE NEXT WEB, Oct. 7, 
2012, http://thenextweb.com/microsoft/2012/10/07/microsoft-accidentally-asked-google-to-censor-bbc-
cbs-cnn-wikipedia-and-even-the-us-government/#!zrtZO (similar); Emil Protalinski, Automated DMCA 
Takedown Requests Are Awful: Microsoft Asked Google to Delete Bing Links, and It Did, THE NEXT 
WEB, Oct. 8, 2102, http://thenextweb.com/microsoft/2012/10/08/automated-dmca-takedown-requests-
are-awful-microsoft-asked-google-to-delete-bing-links-and-it-did/#!zrt0o (similar). 
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counternotify.18  For example, a physician claiming a copyright in his 
signature sent a takedown notice for a document related to the suspension of 
his license to practice medicine.19  Businesses also submit improper 
takedowns in order to suppress discussion of their products or those of their 
competitors.20 
Still other takedowns are motivated by politics, not copyright interests.  
For example, critics of the Argentinian and Ecuadorian governments have 
received DMCA takedown notices, and so have reporters on the controversy 
over the takedowns.21  WordPress alone has documented numerous instances 
of politically motivated takedowns.22  A parody using a video game was 
recently taken down after Donald Trump’s campaign retweeted it.23 
The problem of politically motivated takedowns worsens during 
campaign seasons, when takedown requests can suppress the most effective 
and cheapest means of communicating political messages, because the 
DMCA counternotification process requires a delay of at least ten business 
days before the counternotification becomes effective and the challenged 
material is restored.24  Unless an intermediary is willing to forego the 
 
 18. See, e.g., Timothy Geigner, Tumblr Complies With DMCA Takedown Requests From A Self-
Proclaimed Future-Alien From Another Planet, TECHDIRT (Jun. 23, 2015), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150618/14264131389/tumblr-complies-with-dmca-takedown-
requests-self-proclaimed-future-alien-another-planet.shtml (discussing successful takedowns filed by 
human purportedly acting on behalf of an alien from the future); see also Rob Pegoraro, Trying to Ban 
Links to Software Is the DMCA Joke That Never Gets Old, PROJECT-DISCO.ORG, July 19, 2013, 
http://www.project-disco.org/intellectual-property/071913-trying-to-ban-links-to-software-is-the-dmca-
joke-that-never-gets-old (discussing takedowns directed at software disliked by content providers). 
 19.  Hearing on Section 512 of Title 17: No. 113-86 Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual 
Property, and the Internet, 113th Cong., 5, (2014) (testimony of Katherine Oyama), 
http://judiciary.house.gov/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=BE93D452-945A-4FFF-83EC-B3F51DE782B3. 
 20. Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 2004); see also 
Paul Alan Levy, A Bogus DMCA Takedown from Apple, CONSUMER LAW & POLICY BLOG, Nov. 21, 
2013, http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2013/11/a-bogus-dmca-takedown-from-apple.html; Matt 
Schruers, Observations on DMCA Reform and Notice & Takedown Abuse, PROJECT-DISCO.ORG, May 
23, 2013, http://www.project-disco.org/intellectual-property/052313observations-on-dmca-reform-and-
notice-takedown-abuse/ (“Academic research published some years ago using a limited dataset found that 
‘over half—57%—of [DMCA takedown] notices sent to Google to demand removal of links in the index 
were sent by businesses targeting apparent competitors.’”). 
 21. Adam Steinbaugh, Ares Rights Adopts Matroyshka Doll Approach to Censorious DMCA 
Takedown Notices, ADAM STEINBAUGH’S BLOG ABOUT LAW AND TECHNOLOGY, Sept. 2, 2014, 
http://adamsteinbaugh.com/2014/09/02/ares-rights-adopts-matroyshka-doll-approach-to-censorious-
dmca-takedown-notices/. 
 22. Paul Sieminski, Striking Back Against Censorship, WORDPRESS, Nov. 21, 2013, 
http://en.blog.wordpress.com/2013/11/21/striking-back-against-censorship/. 
 23. Mass Effect political video taken down after Trump retweeted it, 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20160405/05560634102/ea-dmcas-trump-mass-effect-mashup-video-
claiming-trump-re-tweeting-it-made-use-political.shtml. 
 24. Schruers, supra note 20; see, e.g., Campaign Takedown Troubles: How Meritless Copyright 
Claims Threaten Online Political Speech, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY, Sept. 2010, 
https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/copyright_takedowns.pdf (documenting overly aggressive copyright 
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protections of the DMCA against secondary liability—and most are not—a 
fair use can therefore be suppressed at the time of its greatest importance.  
Radio personality Michael Savage was thus able to suppress material 
criticizing his statements about Muslims, and cripple the critic’s planned 
media blitz, including expensive ads in The New York Times that provided 
links to the DMCA-suppressed video—or would have, except that audiences 
could see nothing but the notice that a takedown had occurred if they 
followed the links.25 
The DMCA’s inflexibility about the time a takedown must stay in effect 
means that fair use can’t serve its crucial, First Amendment-protective 
function when it comes to political speech.  As the Supreme Court explained 
in a different context, 
It is well known that the public begins to concentrate on elections only 
in the weeks immediately before they are held. There are short timeframes 
in which speech can have influence. The need or relevance of the speech will 
often first be apparent at this stage in the campaign. The decision to speak is 
made in the heat of political campaigns, when speakers react to messages 
conveyed by others. A speaker’s ability to engage in political speech that 
could have a chance of persuading voters is stifled if the speaker must first 
commence a protracted lawsuit.26 
The problem of political misuses of the DMCA is likely to increase in 
the future given the importance of remix relying on existing footage, usually 
without authorization, in political campaigns.  A study of remix found that 
political videos that became hits were often from nontraditional political 
actors.27  Typical party-sponsored political messages got 55,000 views, while 
citizen-designed political messages averaged 807,000 views.28  Ads created 
by other entities, “mostly media companies, small news organizations, 
groups of bloggers, or small video production groups),” averaged over 2.5 
million views; of the most viral videos, “only a fifth of them were produced 
by the campaigners, and in all cases they were not typical ads, but edited 
footage.”29 
The required takedown period of at least ten business days is not the 
only harm inflicted by misguided DMCA notices.  Recipients of misguided 
 
claims under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act that inappropriately stifle political speech on the 
Internet). 
 25. See John Tehranian, The New ©ensorship, 101 IOWA L. REV. 245 (2015). 
 26. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 334 (2010). 
 27. LIMOR SHIFMAN, MEMES IN DIGITAL CULTURE 125 (2014). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
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notices often can’t afford to fight back or don’t know they can fight back.  
They may mistrust the ways that the notice-sender might use the personal 
information that a counternotification requires; this is especially true with 
improper takedowns of politically or culturally critical fair uses.30  
Separately, most takedowns target search engines under § 512(d), and there 
is no obvious way to provide the original sources with any notice.  Even if 
the targeted speakers somehow learn that their content has been de-indexed, 
there is no obvious way for them to counternotify, since § 512 does not 
require a counternotification process for link removals under § 512(d).31 
As a result, along with defending the substance of fair use, courts must 
also police the misuse of DMCA notices. Given persistent principal-agent 
problems in takedown practice, where copyright owners delegate 
enforcement to entities with little interest in accuracy, the law must provide 
incentives for greater care.32  As Daniel Seng concludes in his empirical 
study of takedown notices, if it costs next to nothing for a reporter to fire off 
a million notices to take down an infringing work, it will fire off a million 
notices to do so, regardless of accuracy or precision, as it improves its 
chances of succeeding in the takedown. And it can do so with impunity, 
because it is largely protected from any collateral damage which it may 
cause.33 Section 512(f) of the DMCA provides for liability for senders of bad 
faith takedowns, but its use has been relatively limited until recently.  As the 
Ninth Circuit properly held in 2015, failure to consider fair use before 
sending a takedown can provide the requisite bad faith.34  However, much 
remains to be worked out before § 512(f) provides a real deterrent to abusive 
takedowns. 
II.  THE PROPER FUNCTION OF COPYRIGHT 
Relatedly, Judge McKeown argues that anti-criticism and privacy-
protection uses of copyright are generally inconsistent with copyright’s 
fundamental purpose.35  Copyright’s goal is not simply to maximize utility.  
That would be a tall order for any law.  Instead, copyright tries to maximize 
 
 30. See Sieminski, supra note 22 (“This tradeoff doesn’t work for the many anonymous bloggers 
that we host on WordPress.com, who speak out on sensitive issues like corporate or government 
corruption.”). 
 31. See generally, Seng, supra note 10 (noting that this absence of procedural protection contributes 
to the infrequency of counternotices). 
 32. Id. at 35–36. 
 33. Id. at 36–37, 48. 
 34. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 35. McKeown, supra note 1, at 2. 
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something else, but what exactly that is—authorship, expression, or 
economically incentivized expression—remains less than perfectly defined.  
Judge McKeown’s useful distinction between harm and copyright harm is 
another way of framing the question of copyright’s purpose.36  If not all harm 
caused by unauthorized uses of copyrighted works is copyright harm, then 
copyright must have a distinguishing function.  If copyright does not have a 
distinctive purpose, by contrast, then it is a right that can be asserted for any 
reason and used as spackle to fill gaps that may exist in other legal regimes. 
We should easily be able to conclude that, if an unauthorized copy was 
also defamatory, the harm wrought by the defamation should not count as 
harm for purposes of weighing against fair use.  The Supreme Court has also 
indicated that harm to an author caused by criticism or mockery, though real, 
is not the kind of harm copyright guards against.37 
But what about privacy?  I agree with Judge McKeown that copyright 
should not be used to substitute for true privacy protection—for example, 
against “revenge porn,” whose harms differ substantially from those of 
ordinary copyright infringement.38  However, copyright has been linked with 
privacy in various ways, including by Brandeis and Holmes in their famous 
article defending the creation of a general right to privacy.  They interpreted 
common-law copyright in unpublished works as a privacy protection 
measure.39  The Supreme Court has similarly endorsed a privacy-like 
rationale in copyright cases, referring to an author’s right not to speak.40  
However, it is important to understand the limits of this rationale, even on 
its own merits.  To the extent that copyright protects an author’s choice not 
to speak because a work isn’t ready, or intended for public view, that 
protection goes to the author’s interest as an author.  In other words, the 
interest ought to be understood as one relating to the expression contributed 
by the author as a creator, not to anything factual in the work.  Facts are not 
protected by copyright.  Likewise, any interests of the subject of the work as 
the person about whom the work communicates are not copyright interests, 
though they may well be important personhood interests.  Their protection 
must lie in the law of defamation and privacy, rather than in copyright. 
 
 36. Id. at 11. 
 37. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591–92 (1994). 
 38. See Rebecca Tushnet, How Many Wrongs Make a Copyright?, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2346, 2352 
(2014). 
 39. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 200–01 
(1890). 
 40. E.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559–60 (1985). 
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This distinction between potential authorial privacy interests and 
factual/subject privacy interests helps explain which privacy interests are 
clearly inappropriate considerations in fair use cases.  Howard Hughes, for 
example, failed to suppress a biography by buying up the copyrights in 
articles used in that biography; his interest was not truly an author/owner’s 
interest, but merely a subject’s.41  Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit recently 
found fair use of a photograph whose subject had bought the copyright in the 
photo in order to sue one of his critics.42  Identifying the target of criticism 
served as transformative fair use of the photo; the harm that the 
subject/copyright owner might suffer was perhaps dignitary, but it wasn’t 
related to anything about his authorship or ownership.  So too in Garcia, as 
Judge McKeown explains, the harm to Garcia flowed not from her interests 
as author and performer, but from the unprotectable fact of her (fraudulently 
induced) participation in Innocence of Muslims.43  There was no match 
between the threats she received as a result of her participation and her 
substantive copyright claim. 
Due to this distinction between harm and copyright harm, I must 
respectfully disagree with Judge McKeown that the decision in Monge v. 
Maya Magazines, Inc.,44 which she also authored, is distinguishable from 
Garcia in terms of the harm involved.45  In Monge, two musicians sued a 
magazine for copyright infringement for printing photos of their secret Las 
Vegas wedding.  They had not intended to distribute the photos, which 
confirmed the existence of their marriage.46  But where was the harm to the 
copyright owner’s interest as an author in the dissemination of these photos, 
as opposed to the subjects’ privacy interests as subjects?  Judge McKeown 
relied on the overstatement in the 1984 case of Harper & Row that “every 
commercial use is presumptively an unfair exploitation,”47 even though this 
statement was explicitly repudiated by the Supreme Court in the 1994 case 
of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose.  In Campbell, the Supreme Court made clear that 
 
 41. Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307, 309 (2d Cir. 1966). 
 42. Katz v. Chevaldina, No. 14-14525, slip op. at 11 (11th Cir. Sept. 17, 2015). 
 43. McKeown, supra note 1, at 5–8. 
 44. 688 F.3d 1164 (2012). 
 45. McKeown, supra note 1, at 9. 
 46. Monge, 688 F.3d at 1169. 
 47. Id. at 1176; McKeown, supra note 1, at 16 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417, 451 (1984))).  But see Monge, 688 F.3d at 1172 (acknowledging, before applying the fair use factors, 
that this statement was not good law). 
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most fair uses would be commercial, and that transformativeness rather than 
commerciality was the touchstone of fair use.48 
The always thoughtful Professor Jane Ginsburg has cautioned against 
limiting the concept of harm in copyright cases: 
If a showing of harm is to become an element of many or most 
infringement claims, whether directly through copyright reform, or through 
the expanding back door of fair use, then it will be important for courts to 
develop a capacious understanding of what “harm” means. If the 
unauthorized use in itself no longer establishes the harm, so that the violation 
is not mere trespass to a property right, but something more, then the 
additional element must account comprehensively both for economic and 
non­economic harm to authors and rightowners.49 
Ginsburg is reacting to proposals that harm should become a more 
important part of infringement cases, especially in evaluating fair use 
defenses.50  She is concerned about preserving new and currently 
undeveloped markets for authors, as well as non-pecuniary interests tied to 
an author’s “vision” of her work and the “integrity” of her creation.  “The 
fundamental purpose of copyright is to foster an environment of respect—
both material and moral—for authorship conducive to creative endeavors.”51  
I disagree that many such non-pecuniary interests deserve protection by 
copyright law, at least with respect to published works.  In a free speech 
culture as robust as the United States’, where insults to dignity are generally 
nonactionable in the absence of defamation, authors should have to slug it 
out with the rest of us, as unpleasant as that may be.  However, even if 
Ginsburg is correct, her emphasis on non-pecuniary interests of the author 
as author may still exclude many of the interests Judge McKeown and I 
agree ought to be off-limits. 
Ginsburg’s argument also raises the question of whether copyright is 
“property.”  She would like to see it treated as such, analogizing to trespass 
to land, where any invasion is actionable even absent a showing of harm.  
But trespass to land isn’t the only way property can be governed.  Trespass 
to chattels generally requires harm to be actionable.  Nuisance law requires 
harm and a balancing of the equities; real property protected by nuisance 
 
 48. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994). 
 49. Jane Ginsburg, Copyright: No Longer a Property Right?, MEDIA INSTITUTE, Nov. 24, 2015, 
http://www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/2015/112415.php (footnote omitted). 
 50. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1175, 1188 (2010) (recommending “that copyright owners be required to prove 
commercial harm when they make claims of infringement other than those involving exact or near­exact 
copies that operate in the same market as the allegedly infringed work”). 
 51. Ginsburg, supra note 49. 
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rules is still property.52  And even land protected by a trespass rule requires 
us to know the boundaries of the land to be protected—the “boundaries” of 
a copyrighted work are often very much up for debate.  The label “property,” 
in fact, answers very few of the questions that we might care about in 
copyright, such as whether Garcia ought to have a cause of action against 
Google. 
And this leads to a related point Judge McKeown makes about fair use 
as a First Amendment bulwark.53  In one view, fair use constrains the scope, 
or limits the boundaries, of copyright rights so that they don’t unduly 
interfere with others’ rights to speak freely.  As Judge McKeown notes, fair 
use can be fairly uncertain, which doesn’t seem all that consistent with First 
Amendment demands for certainty. But then again, if you closely examine 
other First Amendment areas, such as public forum doctrine or obscenity, 
they aren’t all that certain either.  Moreover, fair use has in fact developed 
over time to be broadly predictable.  Scholars have identified categories of 
fair uses that provide reasonable certainty, and professional bodies have 
adopted best practices in fair use to guide practitioners in fields ranging from 
education to filmmaking to choreography; and insurers now accept fair use 
determinations in documentary filmmaking, indicating that fair use is 
serving as a good-enough protection in many circumstances. 
Judge McKeown also repeats Christopher Eisgruber’s claim that 
copyright isn’t censorious, because it doesn’t involve content discrimination 
by the government.54  One reason government doesn’t bring copyright cases 
is that the federal government is excluded from owning its own works by the 
Copyright Act, an exclusion that itself serves free speech goals.55  In other 
countries, where governments do have copyright in government works, 
government censorship is possible.56  Moreover, there is currently a battle 
over whether state and local codes that govern everyday life can be locked 
behind paywalls, so that ordinary citizens are not necessarily free to see and 
 
 52. See, e.g., David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 652, 
682 (2010). 
 53. McKeown, supra note 1, at 6. 
 54. Id. at 4 (quoting Christopher L. Eisgruber, Censorship, Copyright, and Free Speech: Some 
Tentative Skepticism About the Campaign to Impose First Amendment Restrictions on Copyright Law, 2 
J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 17, 18 (2003)). 
 55. See 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, STELLA W. & IRA S. LILLICK, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 2.5.2, 87–98 (1989). 
 56. See David Fewer, Constitutionalizing Copyright: Freedom of Expression and the Limits of 
Copyright in Canada, 55 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 175, 197 (1997) (discussing the use of copyright by 
Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom to suppress publication of government documents). 
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use them without paying.57  But more importantly, every copyright case 
involves the government in deciding whether speech ought to be suppressed, 
and the First Amendment is therefore implicated, even without a government 
plaintiff.  Defamation cases weren’t brought by the government as such, and 
New York Times v. Sullivan is still a foundational First Amendment case.58 
Courts can be sensitive to First Amendment considerations while still 
recognizing that the economic incentive provided by copyright rights can 
regularly be enough to justify sanctions against pure, substitutionary copies.  
This brings us back to the question of the purpose of copyright: when it’s 
limited to providing incentives for economically-motivated expression, and 
when fair use is sufficiently robust, the First Amendment is satisfied. 
III.  OTHER LESSONS FROM GARCIA V. GOOGLE 
Judge McKeown also wrote the opinion for the en banc Ninth Circuit 
in Garcia v. Google,59 and uses that as a jumping-off point for her incisive 
observations on the use of copyright law to obtain non-copyright objectives.  
Another lesson that might be taken away from Garcia, however, is that 
American copyright law hesitates to threaten large corporations.  Authorship 
in individual performers who didn’t sign ironclad contracts—especially 
when paired with the DMCA’s ability to create immediate quasi-injunctive 
relief through takedown notices sent, for example, to Comcast or Netflix—
would have created profound industry uncertainty.  The Second Circuit was 
equally explicit about those risks when it ruled, similarly to the ultimate 
result in Garcia, that performers did not have separate copyright rights in 
performances in motion pictures.60  This concern for copyright owners over 
personal or individual interests is a consequence of the laser focus of 
American copyright law on economic interests, and not, I think, an 
unintended one. 
Judge McKeown notes that Garcia’s claim might well have come out 
differently in Europe, and that the considerations would also have been 
different if she brought a non-copyright claim such as false light.61  She notes 
the “[p]orous and [i]mperfect [p]rivacy [p]rotections in the United States,”62 
 
 57. See American Society for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 534 
(D.D.C. 2015). 
 58. 376 U.S. 254, 305 (1964) (establishing strict First Amendment constraints on defamation claims 
by public figures). 
 59. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 736 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 60. 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 250 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 61. McKeown, supra note 1, at 8. 
 62. Id. at 14. 
3 TUSHNET - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/16  9:37 AM 
410 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY [Vol 15:399 
but the real issue for Garcia was intermediary liability, rather than direct 
liability.  Even a comprehensive privacy law covering the filmmaker’s acts 
towards Garcia would not have changed the outcome in Garcia.  Indeed, 
Garcia already had a number of claims against the filmmaker that seem 
indisputably valid.  However, Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act provides blanket immunity for intermediaries like YouTube for non-
intellectual property claims.63  Section 230 has a huge channeling effect in 
the U.S., driving plaintiffs to seek ways to define their problems as 
intellectual property claims. 
Garcia could also have tried a false endorsement claim, arguing that her 
presence in the altered film implied her endorsement of the views expressed 
therein.  Absent the strong First Amendment protection that has developed 
for traditional forms of media, she could probably at least state a claim.  Had 
she appeared in a video game instead of a short film, she might even have 
prevailed on a right of publicity claim.64  These considerations make clear 
that, to the extent that we are interested in the First Amendment implications 
of suppressing Innocence of Muslims or other works, we need to ensure that 
other causes of action are also limited by First Amendment considerations, 
as defamation and privacy claims have been. 
IV.  FINAL THOUGHTS: CULTURAL CHANGE AND COPYRIGHT 
Judge McKeown identifies significant cultural shifts in the public view 
of copyright, with increased public concern about its possibly censorious 
uses.65  But, culture needed to change to catch up to the massive expansion 
of copyright law over the past few decades, both in terms of how people 
experience copyrighted works in ways that increasingly implicate statutory 
rights and in terms of what counts as infringement.  As Professor Jessica 
Litman has cogently explained, when copyright rights get bigger, exceptions 
to those rights, including fair use, should also get bigger in order to preserve 
the same general structural relationship of free speech to privately owned 
speech.66  A mansion with only the same number of windows as a one-story 
 
 63. In the 9th Circuit, though not elsewhere, state law right of publicity claims are also preempted 
in furtherance of § 230’s goal of national uniformity.  Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 
1125 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 64. See Davis v. Electronic Arts Inc., 775 F.3d 1172, 1175–81 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that use of 
football players’ likenesses in video game was not protected against right of publicity claims by the First 
Amendment). 
 65. McKeown, supra note 1, at 15. 
 66. Jessica Litman, Campbell at 21/Sony at 31, 90 WASH. L. REV. 652–84 (2015). 
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cottage would be awfully dark.  The same can be said for fair use, an 
important bringer of light to culture. 
 
